This paper examines the determinants of the exchange rate regime of a country. A competing risks model is estimated. It is found that the way a country exits a fixed exchange rate regime is affected non-linearly by the duration of the peg. In addition, countries with a lower growth rate of reserves, higher occurrence of banking crises, higher concentration of trade and lower degree of capital-account liberalisation are more likely to experience a crisis-driven exit.
Introduction
A number of countries have abandoned the fixed exchange rate regime and adopted a relatively floating exchange rate arrangement following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Some of these countries (e.g. Japan and Israel) managed to switch to a floating regime without triggering a currency crisis. However, for most countries, the transitions have seldom been smooth. Eichengreen (1999) argues that exits from a pegged exchange rate system have rarely occurred under favourable circumstances. For example, in the cases of Mexico, Thailand and Argentina, the exits were triggered by speculative attacks. The decision to abandon a pegged exchange rate has become one of the most important issues on fiscal and monetary policies. A number of studies have built models to estimate the optimal timing of switching exchange rate regime (Flood & Garber, 1984; Krugman, 1979; Rebelo & Vegh, 2008) . These theories suggest that duration of peg may play an important role in the decision to abandon a fixed exchange rate regime. Along with this line, in empirical side, Klein and Marion (1997) show that the longer a peg lasts, the more likely an exchange rate regime is to change. Walti (2005) finds a non-monotonic relationship between peg duration and the probability of its collapse. Masson and Ruge-Murcia (2005) study the transition between exchange rate regimes using a Markov chain model with time-varying transition probabilities governed by inflation, output growth and trade openness. Klein and Shambaugh (2006) also show that peg duration affects the collapse of an exchange rate regime. Tamgac (2013) finds non-monotonic duration dependence of fixed exchange rate regimes in emerging economies.
The aforementioned studies, however, barely distinguish different natures of exits. Agenor (2004) examines orderly exit from adjustable pegs and exchange rate bands. Since the consequence of orderly exits can be very different from those of crisis-driven exits, misunderstanding of the nature of exits may mislead policy-makers. Surprisingly, limited empirical studies associated peg duration with the modes of leaving a fixed exchange rate system using a competing risks model (CRM) in existing literature. Duttagupta and Otker-Robe (2003) conclude that the peg duration plays an important role in determining the modes of exits using a multinomial logit model. A recent study conducted by Aşıcı (2010) employs binary recursive tree and standard regression analysis to investigate conditions under which orderly or crisis-driven exit is possible.
Our study contribute to the literature by applying the CRM to assess the impacts of peg duration and different time dependent variables on the odds of different modes of exits. As a semi-parametric technique, CRM have several superior features. First, the data for the duration of a fixed exchange rate are usually censoring, 1 which standard methods cannot account for, as many countries still maintain a fixed exchange rate in the sample period. CRM can limit survivorship bias and provide an unbiased estimate of the marginal effects of the peg duration. 2 Second, it introduces duration analysis to study the relation between the probability of exit and the length of staying in a fixed exchange rate. Finally, the impacts of both time-varying covariates and unobserved heterogeneity on the likelihood of exiting an exchange rate peg can be investigated using CRM. Thus, we propose a way to combine the duration analysis with the standard regression method.
The CRM has also a wide variety of applications. For example, He, Chong, Li, and Zhang (2010) apply the model to study the delisting behaviour of public firms, and D'Addio and Rosholm (2005) estimate a CRM for exits from temporary jobs in Europe. We use CRM to distinguish the characteristics of successful transitions (orderly exits) from failed ones (crisis-driven exits). It is found that crisis-driven exits exhibit positive duration dependence, while orderly exits exhibit negative duration dependence. Moreover, an increase in trade concentration lowers the chance of an orderly exit. Countries with a lower growth rate of foreign currency reserves and higher incidence of banking crises are more likely to have crisis-driven exits. Finally, our findings show that capital-account liberalisation is positively related to the chance of an orderly exit.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and variables used. Section 3 briefly reviews the methodology of the CRM. The estimation results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Data
Our sample consists of monthly data on the peg duration and country-specific variables from 79 countries in the period from January 1972 to December 2001. 3 As the actual exchange rate arrangements of countries might differ from the official announcements, we use the de facto classification method of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) to construct the sample of peg durations. 4 In accordance with Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) , we define an exit from a fixed exchange rate regime to a flexible one as a shift from any fixed categories to managed floating, freely floating or freely falling. Following Duttagupta and Otker-Robe (2003), a crisis-driven exit is identified if the end-of-month exchange rate movement is larger than two times the standard deviation of the monthly depreciation rate, that is
where ε t is the average monthly depreciation rate of nominal exchange rate at the time of regime shift (units of the national currency per U.S. dollar),ε is the average monthly depreciation rate during a given peg, σ is the standard deviation of monthly depreciation rate during the same period. The remaining exits are treated as orderly exits. The results of our crisis-driven are obtained using the classification method similar to that of Glick, Guo, and Hutchison (2006) . To assess the consistence of the model we estimated, we also follow the methods of Asici and Wyplosz (2003) , 5 Detragiache, Mody, and Okada (2005) and Aşıcı (2010) 6 to define crisis-driven exits, and find that our results remain unchanged. The duration of an exchange rate peg is defined as the time spent on currency peg. One hundred and thirty-three duration observations are obtained from the sample; 82 pegged durations ended in or before December 2001; and the remaining 51 observations are rightcensored. The data descriptions are given in Table 1 . Table 2 summarises the statistics of durations for the two types of exits. The average duration of a peg is 131 months, the median duration is 105 months and the range of duration for a peg is from 3 months to 360 months. A total of 82 terminations of currency peg are identified, of which 30 are crisis-driven exits and 52 are orderly exits. Furthermore, pegged exchange rate regime lasts significantly longer in crisis-driven exits than in orderly exits. 
Methodology
We let the peg duration be a realisation of a random variable T, and the indicator of the type of exits a realisation of a random variable be R. The hazard function for an exit of type r (the cause-specific hazard) is defined as
Equation (2) captures the conditional probability that a peg terminates at time T = t and type R = r, given that it has survived till time t. The probability that an exit of type r occurs in the interval (t, t + dt) is the event-specific density function:
where S(t) = Pr(T ≥ t).
For country i, let t 1 i be the duration of a peg before an orderly exit and t 2 i be the duration of a peg before a crisis-driven exit. The two types of exits are mutually exclusive. We define t i = min(t 1 i , t 2 i ). Let r i be an indicator variable, which equals 0 under a pegged exchange rate system, 7 equals 1 if there is an orderly exit from a peg to a floating and equals 2 if there is a crisisdriven exit. We observe an event or censoring time t i and a categorical variable r i indicating whether they are censored. The data are censored if r i = 0 and are uncensored if r i = 1 or 2. Considering Cox proportional hazard (PH) models of the form:
where x(t) is observed characteristics denoted by potential explanatory variables at time t and t r 1 < · · · < t r k r denotes the k r ordered failures of type r; β r is the vector of coefficients to be estimated; h r 0 (t) is the baseline hazard. The likelihood function for the Cox CRM is
where the risk set R(t r j ) is the set of countries still at risk of fixed exchange rate termination (r) prior to time j. State dependence might arise due to unobserved heterogeneity. To incorporate unobserved heterogeneity into our model, 8 the Cox CRM can be extended to include a multiplicative term v, that is
where v r is the destination-specific and unobserved individual effect. We assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is independent of observed characteristics and follows a Gamma distribution with unit mean and variance theta. In the PH CRM, the interpretation of the parameters is analogous to the Cox PH model. The marginal effect of a certain variable x k , on the chance of entering state r, is
when β r k > 0, an increase in x k will increase the probability of leaving the pegged exchange rate system for a certain destination state r relative to the probability of staying with the peg. The PH CRM also allows us to compare the odds of each type of exits. If β r k > β j k ∀j = r, an increase in x k increases the conditional probability of exiting from route r. The survivorship bias is resolved by the competing risk model through explicitly modelling the likelihood of different types of exits. A common mistake is to treat exiting a pegged exchange rate system due to other causes as censored events.
Results
To examine the general distribution of exits, we begin with a preliminary model without explanatory variables and determine the standard non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimators. Figures 1-3 present the estimated hazard functions for both types of exits from a pegged exchange rate system. The results for all exits show a mildly non-monotonic pattern of duration dependence. However, crisis-driven exits exhibit positive duration dependence in general, while orderly exits exhibit negative duration dependence. The positive duration dependence for the crisis-driven exit can be attributable to the fact that the average durations of pegged regime is 128 months for the crisis-driven exit and 71 for the orderly exit. The positive duration dependence is also consistent with the abruptly exits for countries including Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines during Asian financial crisis. Their durations before the exits range from as low as 141 months for Philippines to as high as 311 months for Korea. These durations exceeds the average durations for orderly exit by at least twofold. The estimated survival functions in Figure 4 show that orderly exits are more likely to occur in the early stage of a peg than those of crisis-driven exits are. Cox CRM could handle time-varying explanatory variables. In addition, the baseline hazard ratio estimated by Cox CRM can capture the duration dependence. For control variables, we use data available from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and other sources, covering most determinants suggested by currency crisis theory and the optimal currency area theory.
We use an array of country-specific variables in our analysis. The macroeconomic variables cover openness, trade concentration, domestic inflation rate, economic growth and output volatility. Financial variables include base-country interest rate, 9 foreign debt, capital-account liberalisation, incidence of banking crises and central bank independence (CBI). Political and institutional variables include democratisation, country type and hyperinflation. Note that the traditional measures of capital-account liberalisation are based on the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Such measure might not adequately reflect the actual or de facto exposure of countries to international capital markets (Table 3) . In this paper, we use the measure of capital-account liberalisation that focuses exclusively on portfolio equity and foreign direct investment holdings (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) .
The estimation results for the standard Cox CRM are presented in Table 4 . The results for Cox CRM with unobserved heterogeneity are reported in Table 5 .
For both models, we control the country-specific time-varying explanatory variables. In the baseline Model (1), the selected variables include openness, trade concentration, inflation, output growth, output volatility, interest rate and capital-account liberalisation. Country-specific attributes are taken into account in models (2)-(5). Note, from Table 5 , that σ 2 v are close to zero in all models, and we do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis for σ 2 v = 0. It is found that the main estimates are almost identical to those of the standard model. Furthermore, all the σ 2 v except for the orderly exit in model 3 are close to zero. Therefore, the survival data do not have strong unobserved heterogeneity. The coefficients for the degree of openness are negative in all cases. It is a significant consideration for orderly exits, but insignificant for crisis-driven exits. Increase in openness greatly reduces the chance of an orderly exit, implying that the benefits of trade openness outweighs the costs of vulnerability to external shocks.
For orderly exit, the coefficient for trade concentration is strongly negative in model (2). A high concentration of trade improves the linkage between the home and its base countries, which in turn reduces the probability of an orderly exit. On the other hand, low concentration of trade exacerbates a given misalignment and leads to a crisis-driven exit. Therefore, the crisis-driven exit coefficients are strongly positive in most models. The coefficient for the inflation rate is significantly positive for orderly exits but slightly negative for crisis-driven exits. Higher inflation in home country compared with that of the base country under the peg leads to overvaluation of the real exchange rate. Thus, abandoning the peg can result in a higher chance of an orderly exit, which proves beneficial for a country's sustainable development. The coefficient for the degree of capital-account liberalisation is significantly positive for orderly exits but insignificant for the crisis-driven exits. The result is consistent with Glick et al.'s (2006) finding that countries with liberalised capital accounts might also have better economic fundamentals, which make them less vulnerable to currency crises. For countries with liberalised capital accounts, the floating exchange rate arrangement provides a better insulation for output against aggregate demand shocks. It also implies that an orderly exit is not likely to occur when capital control is still in place.
Note that the effect of economic growth (GDP_GROWTH) is negative but insignificant in all models. The coefficients for the volatility of output (GDP_VOLATILITY) and the interest rate of the base country are strongly positive for both exits in most models. A country with high volatility might prefer flexible exchange rate regime to avert economic shocks. Such preference reduce the probability of maintaining pegged exchange rate regime. Increased interest rates of the base country accelerate capital outflows from the home country, forcing the abandonment of the peg. It is noteworthy that the estimated coefficient is larger for crisis-driven exits, suggesting that increased interest rate in base country heightens the chance of a crisis-driven exit. Consequently, the peg requires home country to follow the monetary policies of its base country. For example, Miniane and Rogers (2007) find that local interest rates are more likely to follow base interest rates for countries maintained pegged exchange system. Such regime might not be optimal and could potentially make home economy more vulnerable to speculative attacks. Di Giovanni and Shambaugh (2007) find similar evidence that a high base-country interest rate has a contractionary effect on domestic economy, especially for a country with a fixed exchange rate. Our findings are robust across models, except for model (2), in which controlling the degree of CBI, a negative coefficient for the volatility of output in the orderly exit case is estimated. Some important results are obtained. First, a higher turnover of central bank governors (less CBI) induces a higher likelihood of an orderly exit. Second, we find that the conditional probability of an exit is not affected by democracy, hyperinflation or whether the country is developed or developing. Note that hyperinflation reduces the probability of leaving the pegged exchange system. The peg provides a potential nominal anchor for a central bank to achieve its inflation target. Third, rapid growth in foreign currency reserves signifies the peg and reduces the probability of crisis-driven exits (Chong, He, & Hinich, 2008) . Also, note that the coefficient for the net debt position variable is strongly negative for orderly exits. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) point out that foreign debt is the main contributing factor for a country to peg its currency in order to avoid exchange rate volatility. Thus, a high level of foreign liabilities reduces the tendency towards adopting a floating regime. Finally, the incidence of banking crises significantly increases the chance of crisis-driven exits, whereas it has no apparent effect on orderly exits.
After controlling the country-specific time-varying factors and unobserved heterogeneity (in model (1)), we retrieve the baseline hazard functions for both types of exits using Cox CRM. Figures 5 and 6 show the plots of the smoothed versions of these functions. Note that the hazard functions remain unchanged in general; in addition, crisis-driven exits exhibit positive duration dependence, while orderly exits are more likely to occur at the early stage of a peg. The volatility of the probability for duration over 200 months might be due to the lack of observations that have a long duration of peg.
Conclusion
For many developing countries, the fixed exchange rate regime serves as a temporary policy measure to stabilise domestic inflation and foster steady economic growth. However, pegs might also constrain the flexibilities of domestic monetary policies and make the domestic financial system vulnerable to speculative attacks. This paper employs the CRM to investigate the effects of a country's attributes on termination of fixed exchange rate regime. Two types of exits from the pegged exchange rate regime, namely, the crisis-driven exit and the orderly exit, are investigated. The two types of exits are very different in nature and in policy implications. A crisis-driven exit often results in economic turbulence, while an orderly exit has less implication on economic stability. A CRM with time-varying explanatory variables is estimated to uncover the way that the peg duration affects the likelihoods of crisis-driven and orderly exits. After controlling country-specific time-varying factors and unobserved heterogeneity, our results estimated by Cox CRM reveals that crisis-driven exits exhibit positive duration dependence, while orderly exits exhibit negative duration dependence. Second, it is found that countries with higher degree of openness and trade concentration have a lower chance of orderly exits. Third, it is shown that capital-account liberalisation increases the chance of orderly exits, while it has no apparent effect on the likelihood of crisis-driven exits. Last but not least, it is found that the likelihood of crisis-driven exits increases with the incidences of banking crises.
